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Capital Structure* 
I. Introduction 
Most capital structure models assume that the decision 
of how much debt to issue is a static choice. In prac- 
tice, however, firms adjust outstanding debt levels in 
response to changes in firm value. In this article, we 
solve for the optimal dynamic capital strategy of a 
firm and investigate the implications for optimal lev- 
erage ratios and the magnitude of the tax benefits to 
debt. 
Below, we consider. only the option to increase fu- 
ture debt levels. While in theory management can both 
increase and decrease future debt levels, Gilson (1997) 
finds that transactions costs discourage debt reductions 
outside of Chapter 11. In addition, equity's ability to 
A model of dynamic cap- 
ital structure is proposed. 
Even though the optimal 
strategy is implemented 
over an arbitrarily large 
number of restructuring- 
periods, a scaling feature 
inherent in the framework 
permits simple closed- 
form expressions to be 
obtained for equity and 
debt prices. When a firm 
has the option to increase 
future debt levels, tax ad- 
vantages to debt increase 
significantly, and both the 
optimal leverage ratio 
range and predicted credit 
spreads are more in line 
with what is observed in 
practice. * An earlier version of this article, entitled "Endogenous Bank- 
ruptcy, Endogenous Restructuring, and Dynamic Capital Structure," 
was presented at the 1998 Western Finance Association. Most of 
the work on this article was completed while the first author was 
affiliated with Ohio State University. We would like to thank Pierre 
Collin Dufresne, Domenico Cuoco, Jean Helwege, Rene Stulz, Alex 
Triantis, and seminar participants at Duke University and Ohio State 
University for their insightful comments. We especially thank an 
anonymous referee for many insightful comments. Any remaining 
errors are our sole responsibility. 
(Journal of Business, 2001, vol. 74, no. 4) 
X 2001 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 
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force concessions when the firm is in distress (Anderson and Sundaresan 1996; 
Mella-Barral and Perraudin 1997) may further reduce equity's incentive to 
repurchase outstanding debt.' 
Compared to an otherwise identical firm that is constrained to a static capital 
structure decision, a firm's option to increase future debt levels has two im- 
mediate consequences. First, management will choose to issue a smaller 
amount of debt initially. This might explain why most static models predict 
optimal leverage ratios that are well above what is observed in practice. 
Second, for a given level of initial debt, bonds issued from such a firm are 
riskier, since the bankruptcy threshold rises with the level of outstanding debt. 
This might explain why most static models predict yield spreads that are too 
low.2 While covenants are often in place to protect debt holders, in practice 
firms typically have the option to issue additional debt in the future without 
recalling the outstanding debt issues. Furthermore, in the event of bankruptcy, 
it is typical that all unsecured debt receives the same recovery rate, regardless 
of the issuance date.3 Clearly, such debt is riskier than that modeled in both 
the "traditional" static capital structure models (e.g., Brennan and Schwartz 
1978; Leland 1994; Leland and Toft 1996), and most corporate bond pricing 
models (e.g., Longstaff and Schwartz 1995), where it is assumed that the 
bankruptcy threshold remains constant over time. Interestingly, within our 
framework, when a firm has the right to issue additional debt at a specified 
upper boundary, Vu, and it is assumed that all debt will receive the same 
recovery rate in the event of bankruptcy, then the present value of the current 
debt issue is the same as if it were callable at par when firm value reaches 
V,. In this sense, it is clear that such debt is not as valuable as debt issued 
by a firm constrained to never issue additional debt. This lower price in turn 
implies a higher yield spread. 
Models of dynamic capital structure choice have been proposed by Kane, 
Marcus, and McDonald (1984, 1985) and Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner 
(1989). Concerned with the possibility of arbitrage inherent in the "tradi- 
tional frameworks," Fischer et al. base their model on the following as- 
sumptions: 
1. The value of an optimally levered firm can only exceed its unlevered 
1. In addition, the fact that equity prices tend to trend upward and that a typical maturity 
structure is a quickly decaying function of time (see Barclay and Smith 1995) makes the option 
to issue additional debt a more important feature to account for than the option to repurchase 
outstanding debt. 
2. The strategic debt service literature of Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) and Mella-Barral 
and Perraudin (1997) also help explain these puzzles. However, if the maturity structure of debt 
were modeled as it is observed in practice, i.e., a quickly decaying maturity structure (Barclay 
and Smith 1995), with an average maturity of about 7 years (Stohs and Mauer 1996), rather 
than as a perpetuity, as in Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), then the strategic debt argument 
by itself is not sufficient to explain the observed yield spreads. 
3. Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) report that in December 1992, GMAC had 53 outstanding 
long-term debt issues listed in Moody's Bank and Finance Manual and that all would likely 
receive the same recovery rate in the event of bankruptcy. 
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value by the amount of transactions costs incurred in order to lever 
it up. 
2. A firm that follows an optimal financing policy offers a fair risk- 
adjusted rate of return. Therefore, if leverage is advantageous, then 
it follows that unlevered firms offer a below-fair expected rate of 
return. 
Their first assumption is intended to eliminate the following arbitrage strat- 
egy: purchase the firm cheaply, lever it up, then sell for a riskless profit. 
Their second assumption implies that tax benefits to debt are to be measured 
as a flow, not as an increase in value. However, we argue that these as- 
sumptions do not hold in practice. First, consider a firm whose (well-en- 
trenched) management refuses to take on debt (e.g., Microsoft). It would 
be irrational for agents to push the value of the firm up to its optimally 
levered value, since shareholders are currently not receiving any tax benefits. 
Furthermore, the above-mentioned arbitrage strategy is not operational: usu- 
ally, a bidder must pay a large premium in order to gain control of man- 
agement to force an optimal capital structure policy to be followed. This 
premium will typically eliminate any profit from such a strategy. Note that 
this first assumption predicts that no portion of the premium paid during a 
managed buyout is due to increased tax benefits, since all benefits are as- 
sumed to be embedded into the price before the buyout. This prediction is 
in conflict with the findings of both Kaplan (1989) and Leland (1989). 
While the second assumption might be applicable to an all-equity home 
owner who forgoes tax benefits that are inherent in a mortgage on a house,4 
we argue that it is not applicable for publicly traded assets. Rather, rational 
agents in the economy will push down current prices so that fair expected 
return is obtained on any traded asset regardless of the policies followed by 
management. 
Kane et al. (1984, 1985) and Fischer et al. (1989) obtain relatively simple 
solutions for the optimal dynamic strategy because their assumptions effec- 
tively reduce the analysis to a one-period framework.5 Indeed, the boundary 
conditions satisfied by the levered firm value in Fischer et al. (1989, eqq. 
[11]-[12]) are exactly the boundary conditions satisfied by a firm that wishes 
to be leveraged for just one single period. As a consequence of these as- 
sumptions, Fischer et al. (1989) predict that the tax benefits to debt are mostly 
negligible and that tax benefits to debt are an increasing function of firm value 
volatility. Both of these results contradict the more direct tax-benefit mea- 
surements of Graham (2000) and the results obtained below. 
In this article, we determine the optimal capital structure strategy of a firm 
when it has the option to increase debt levels in the future. In particular, we 
investigate the contingent cash flows for arbitrary capital structure strategies 
4. This example was given by Kane et al. (1985) to motivate their assumption. 
5. Kane et al. (1985) acknowledge so much themselves. 
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and allow management to choose the one that maximizes current shareholder 
wealth, subject to limited liability. 
A scaling feature inherent in our framework permits simple closed-form 
expressions to be obtained for the security prices even though the optimal 
strategy is implemented over an arbitrarily large number of restructurings. 
The intuition is as follows.6 Define period 0 as the time interval for which 
firm value remains between the bankruptcy threshold VO and the restructuring 
threshold V?. The value of the firm when a capital structure decision is made 
is VO?. If VO is reached, the firm declares bankruptcy, and all future cash flows 
are zero. However, if VL? is reached, the firm increases its debt level, and 
period 1 begins. Define the claim to period 0 cash flows as CFo. The scaling 
feature implies that the present value of period n cash flows equal CFO * A n, 
where the endogenously obtained constant f accounts for both the fact that 
each period's cash flows scale upward by a factor -y V,j/VO? and that these 
cash flows will be discounted for both time and risk of default. This scaling 
feature implies that the present value of the claim to all period's cash flows 
iS 
00 CFO* = CF0 
Hence, it is the factor (1/(1 - p)) that captures the dynamic features of our 
framework. 
We note that the traditional framework for these models is to endow the 
unlevered equity with log-normal dynamics and take it to be the state variable 
of the model. While the model proposed below can be set in this traditional 
framework,7 we propose a framework similar to that used by Mello and Parsons 
(1992), Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), and others that we feel offers 
several advantages. But before introducing this proposed framework, we re- 
view the traditional framework. The state variable in the traditional framework 
is the unlevered equity value, which is presumed to have the following risk- 
neutral dynamics: 
dV / b  (r- )dt+uadz Q. 
Here, V is the unlevered equity value, r is the (pretax) risk-free rate, &/V is 
the payout rate, and a is the unlevered firm volatility. The present value of 
both the tax-benefit claim and the bankruptcy-cost claim are then determined 
for a given level of debt issuance in order to estimate the net tax benefits to 
debt. However, the risk-neutral drift being set to (r - s/V) raises the "delicate 
6. For more details, see app. B. 
7. In an earlier version, we used the traditional framework to measure the present value of 
tax benefits and bankruptcy costs of all periods in order to determine optimal strategy. Results 
similar to those presented below were obtained. 
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issue" of whether the unlevered firm remains a traded asset after debt has 
been issued.8 
Another difficulty with these models is that they treat cash flows to gov- 
ernment (via taxes) in a manner fundamentally different from that with which 
they treat cash flows to equity and debt. Indeed, they model the "tax benefit" 
as an inflow of funds, rather than as a reduction of outflow of funds. Hence, 
these models characterize firm payout as the sum of dividends and coupon 
payments, less this tax benefit inflow, even though the assets that generate 
the cash flows for dividend and interest payments are the same assets that 
generate the cash flows for tax payments. This characterization leads to several 
problems. First, it causes comparative statics analysis to predict that equity 
value is an increasing function of the tax rate, since the "tax benefit" paid to 
equity increases with this rate. From a normative standpoint, this prediction 
is in conflict with a discounted cash flow analysis of equity pricing, unless 
an increase in the tax rate leads either to an increase in the growth rate of 
future cash flows or to a decrease in the risk of the cash flow streams-both 
of which seem unlikely. Furthermore, Lang and Shackelford (1998) provide 
strong evidence against this prediction by investigating stock price reactions 
during the week that the May 1997 budget accord was signed.9 In contrast, 
our model predicts equity prices are a decreasing function of the tax rate. 
Second, the traditional framework may significantly overestimate the risk- 
neutral drift (r - 6/V), which in turn will cause the probability of bankruptcy 
to be biased downward, ceteris paribus. In contrast, in our framework, the 
appropriate risk-free rate is the after-tax rate, and the appropriate payout ratio 
includes payouts to government via taxes.'" Empirically we find that our 
framework implies a significantly lower risk-neutral drift than the traditional 
framework, in turn predicting higher probability of bankruptcy, thus leading 
to a lower optimal leverage ratio. Indeed, to compensate for this bias, models 
using the traditional framework typically need to assume unrealistically large 
bankruptcy costs in order to obtain yield spreads consistent with empirical 
evidence. Such large bankruptcy costs are in conflict with the empirical ev- 
idence of Andrade and Kaplan (1998) and also force the predicted recovery 
rates to be considerably lower than those observed. 
As a third difficulty, the traditional models cannot justify their assumption 
that the payout ratio &/V is a constant, independent of V. Indeed, since the 
interest payments and related tax benefits are presumed to be constant, these 
models inherently assume that the equity dividend ratio changes dramatically 
8. Criticism of this approach is noted in n. 11 of Leland (1994). Eliminating this "delicate 
issue" is one of the motivating factors behind the frameworks of Kane et al. (1984, 1985) and 
Fischer et al. (1989). Hence, it is reassuring that this criticism can be circumvented without 
needing to accept the previously mentioned assumptions of their models. 
9. The budget accord reduced the long-term capital gains from 28% to 20%. 
10. Note that in our framework both 6 and Vwill be larger, since now Vincludes the government 
claim. Still, our estimates using Compustat find the risk-neutral drift to be significantly lower in 
our model than in the traditional model. 
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with changes in firm value, in conflict with empirical findings. In contrast, in 
the model proposed below, where the cash flow to government is treated in 
the same fashion as cash flows to equity and debt, an increase in firm value 
leads to an increase in tax payments making more reasonable the assumption 
that the payout ratio is constant. 
To overcome these difficulties, we propose a different framework. Even 
before Black and Scholes (1973), it was realized that it is better to model 
(equity + debt) as having log-normal dynamics than it is to model equity 
alone as having log-normal dynamics." Here, we extend this logic and model 
the dynamics of the claim to earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) as log- 
normal. The implication is that all contingent claimants (equity, debt, gov- 
ernment, etc.) to future EBIT flows are treated in a consistent fashion.'2 Below, 
we assume that EBIT is invariant to changes in capital structure. This follows 
from the usual assumption of separation of investment and financing policy. 
Such an approach has intuitive appeal: the EBIT-generating machine, which 
is the source of firm value, runs independently of how the EBIT flow is 
distributed among its claimants. In particular, an extra dollar paid out, whether 
to taxes, interest payments, or dividends, affects the firm in the same way. 
One advantage of this framework is that, as in practice, levered and unlevered 
equity never exist simultaneously. Another advantage is that, in contrast to 
the unlevered firm value, which ceases to exist on issuance of debt, the claim 
to future EBIT flow should in practice be reasonably insensitive to changes 
in capital structure. Hence, the claim to EBIT flow is an appropriate choice 
for state variable. Indeed, this invariance feature makes our framework ideal 
for investigating multiple capital structure changes and, hence, optimal dy- 
namic capital structure strategy. As demonstrated below, when a firm has the 
ability to increase its leverage in the future, predicted optimal leverage ratios 
are reasonably consistent with observed ratios. 
Our framework has some similarity to that proposed by Graham (2000), 
who models EBIT flow to obtain an estimate of the tax advantage to debt. 
Since it is numerically based, his framework can accurately account for tax 
carry-forward and tax carry-back effects. His model first obtains an estimate 
of the marginal tax rate associated with an extra dollar of debt and then 
subtracts a "personal tax penalty" that exists due to the tax rate on interest 
being higher than the tax rate on capital gains. Note, however, that the frame- 
work requires the equity holder to pay this personal tax penalty no matter 
how poorly the firm performs in the future. That is, this model does not permit 
equity holders to choose bankruptcy. Besides affecting the estimated tax ad- 
vantage to debt, such a framework precludes an estimate of the spread paid 
on the risky debt, since the debt is presumed to be riskless. Still, we find 
estimates of the optimal tax advantage to debt to be very similar to those 
obtained by Graham (2000). 
11. For empirical support, see Toft and Prucyk (1997). 
12. A similar argument has been suggested recently by Galai (1998). 
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The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section II investigates a one- 
time capital structure decision of management whose objective is to maximize 
current shareholder wealth. Results are compared to Leland (1994). We also 
determine the current value of unlevered equity when a (static) capital structure 
change may occur in the future. In Section III, we determine optimal dynamic 
capital structure when management is able to increase its outstanding debt in 
the future. We conclude in Section IV. 
II. Optimal Static Capital Structure 
Here we consider a simple model of firm dynamics. To emphasize that the 
proposed framework is self-consistent, we demonstrate that it can be supported 
within a rational-expectations general equilibrium framework. Consider a spe- 
cial case of Goldstein and Zapatero (1996). The single technology of a (pure- 
exchange) economy produces a payout flow that is specified by the process 
db 
A pdt + adz, (1) 
where ,up and a are constants. It can be shown that if the representative agent 
has a power-function utility, then both the endogenously obtained risk pre- 
mium 0 and risk-free rate r supported by this economy are constants. It is 
well known that any asset of the economy can then be priced by discounting 
expected cash flows under the risk-neutral measure. In particular, the value 
of the claim to the entire payout flow is 
V(t) =EtQf dsbe-rs) 
(2) 
where t = (,up - O) is the risk-neutral drift of the payout flow rate: 
d, = ,udt + adz Q. 
Since r and it are constants, both V and 6 share the same dynamics: 
dV 
- = ,udt + adzQ. (3) 
It follows that 
dV + adt dV d= rdt + adzQ. (4) V 
Thus, the total risk-neutral expected return on the claim is the risk-free rate, 
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as necessary. The existence of an equivalent martingale measure guarantees 
that every contingent claim of this economy will receive fair expected return 
for the risk borne. Note that this is in contrast to the assumptions of Kane et 
al. (1984, 1985) and Fischer et al. (1989). 
We assume a simple tax structure that includes personal as well as corporate 
taxes. Interest payments to investors are taxed at a personal rate -i, "effective" 
dividends are taxed at r,,13 and corporate profits are taxed at -r, with full loss 
offset provisions. 
First, consider a debtless firm with current value VO. Note that in the present 
framework there is no such thing as an all-equity firm. Rather, both equity 
and government have a claim to the firm's payouts. Assume that the current 
management refuses to take on any debt and that no takeover is likely (e.g., 
Microsoft). Then, the current firm value is divided between equity and gov- 
ernment as 
E = (1 - eff)VO; (5) 
G = TeffVO9 (6) 
where the effective tax rate is 
( - reff) = (1 - )(1 d)- 
Now, consider an otherwise identical firm whose management decides to 
choose a (static) debt level that will maximize the wealth of current equity 
holders.'4 It will issue a consol bond, promising a constant coupon payment 
C to debt holders as long as the firm remains solvent. Due to the issuance of 
a perpetuity, the threshold at which the firm chooses to default is time-in- 
dependent. We define this threshold as VB. If firm value reaches VB, then an 
amount aGVB will be lost to bankruptcy costs. 
In general, any claim must satisfy the partial differential equation (PDE) 
or2 
AuVFV + 2 V2FVV + Ft + P = rF, 7 
where P is the payout flow. Due to the issuance of perpetual debt, all claims 
will be time-independent. Thus the PDE reduces to an ordinary differential 
equation: 
or2 
O = uVFv + V2FV+P-rF (8) 2 
The general solution to 
13. We shall be interpreting effective dividends to account for the fact that much of the double 
taxation occurs at a significantly lower, deferred-capital gains rate. 
14. We emphasize that, although the actual shares of stock are not recalled after such a debt 
issuance takes place, there no longer exists a claim to the contingent cash flows of the unlevered 
equity claim. Hence, the "delicate issue" referred to previously is circumvented in this framework. 
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0 = ,AVFv+-V2FVV-rF (9) 2 
is 
FGS = AV-y + A2V-X (10) 
where 
1 =o[(c--2\ Icr +2\12] 
1 r( 22 
X [I -f +- X + 2rU2] 
and A1 and A2 are constants, determined by boundary conditions. Note that 
x is positive, while y is negative, so the first term explodes as V becomes 
large. Hence, in this section, A1 equals zero for all claims of interest. 
The general solution does not account for intertemporal cash flows. Rather, 
these are accounted for by the particular solution. For example, if the relevant 
cash flow is the entire payout, P = = V(r -,u), then the particular solution 
to equation (8) is 
EkS=V (11) 
Whereas, if the relevant payout is the coupon payment, P = C, then the 
particular solution to equation (8) is 
FPC2= _. (12) 
Before proceeding, it is convenient to define PB(V) as the present value of 
a claim that pays $1 contingent on firm value reaching VB. Since such a claim 
receives no intermediate cash flows, we know from equation (10) that 
PB(V) will be of the form 
PB(V) = A1VY + A2VX. (13) 
Taking into account the boundary conditions 
lim PB(V) = 0, lim PB(V) = 1, 
V-X V-WB 
we find 
PB(V) = (V)JX (14) 
While the firm is solvent, equity, government, and debt share the payout 
W through dividends, taxes, and coupon payments, respectively. Now, if all 
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three claims were held by a single owner, she would be entitled to the entire 
payout 6 as long as firm value remained above VB. We define the value of 
this claim as VMOv (V). From equations (10) and (11), we know VM1,v is of the 
form 
YON = V + A1V-Y + A2Vx. (15) 
For V? VB, this claim must approach total firm value V. This implies that 
A, = 0. For V = VB, the value of this claim vanishes. This constraint deter- 
mines A2, giving 
YON= V -VBP(V). (16) 
The value of the claim to interest payments during continued operations, 
Vint9 can be obtained in a similar fashion. As long as the firm remains solvent, 
the coupon payment is C. Thus, from equations (10) and (12), Vin, is of the 
form 
C 
Vint =-+ AIV-Y + A2V-x. (17) 
r 
Again, for V > VB, DC -+ C/r, implying A, = 0. Accounting for the fact that 
this claim vanishes at V = VB, we obtain 
C 
Vint - [- PB (V)]. (18) r 
Separating the value of continuing operations between equity, debt, and 
government, we find 
ESOIV(V)= (1 - aeff)(Molv - VintY) (19) 
Gsolv(V)= eff(Vso1v - Vint) + TiVino (20) 
DSOlV ( ) = (1 - 'OVint. (21) 
Note that the sum of these three claims adds up to Vsolv. 
Equation (19) is straightforward to interpret from a cash flow standpoint. 
From the theorem of Feynman and Kac, it is well known that the value of 
VsOlv(V) in equation (16) can be obtained from the risk-neutral expectation 
Vsolv(VO) = El?(fdse ras), (22) 
where T is the (random) bankruptcy time. Similarly, Vint(V) in equation (18) 
can be obtained from the risk-neutral expectation 
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Vint(VO) = EQ?( dse7rsC). (23) 
Thus, equation (19) can be written in the form 
SOIJVO) = (1 - Teff)Eo [dse (6s - C)] (24) 
Equation (24) implies that, at each instant, s, equity has a claim to (1 - 
-TCff)(bs - C)1(t7's. That is, after the coupon payment is made, what remains 
is divided between equity and government according to the tax code. Similar 
interpretations hold for the other claims. 
Due to protective covenants, no part of the EBIT flow machine may be 
sold off by shareholders. When the payout level falls below promised interest 
payments, equity has the right to infuse payments to avoid bankruptcy. How- 
ever, for a sufficiently poor state of the firm, shareholders will optimally choose 
to default. At this point, the remaining firm value is divided up between debt, 
government, and bankruptcy costs.'5 
The present value of the default claim Vdef(V) can be written as 
Vdef = A,V-y + A2V-x. (25) 
For V?> VB, the value of this claim must vanish, so again A, = 0. The bound- 
ary condition Vdef(V = VB) = VB implies 
Vdef(V) = VBPB(V). (26) 
Note that the sum of the present value of the claim to funds during solvency 
(eq. [16]) and the present value of the claim to funds in bankruptcy (eq. [26]) 
is equal to the present value of the claim to EBIT, V. Hence, value is neither 
created nor destroyed by changes in the capital structure. Rather, it is only 
redistributed among the claimants. This invariance result is reminiscent of the 
"pie" model of Modigliani and Miller (1958), except that in this framework 
the claims of government and bankruptcy costs are also part of that pie. 
The default claim is divided up among debt, government, and bankruptcy 
costs as follows: 
Ddef(V) = (1 - )(- reff)Vdef(V), (27) 
Gdef(V) = (1 - r)TeffVdef(V), (28) 
BCdef(V) = axVdef(V). (29) 
15. We assume that, in the event of bankruptcy, the remaining portion of the EBIT-generating 
machine not lost to bankruptcy costs is sold to competitors. Since they will have to pay taxes 
on future EBIT, government indeed has a claim in bankruptcy. 
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We also account for restructuring costs, which are deducted from the pro- 
ceeds of the debt issuance before distribution to equity occurs. These costs 
are assumed to be proportional to the initial value of the debt issuance:'6 
RC(VO) = q[Ds01v (VO) + Ddef (Vo)]. (30) 
A. Optimal Default Level 
We assume that management chooses the coupon level C and the bankruptcy 
level VB to maximize equity wealth, subject to limited liability.'7 The optimal 
bankruptcy level VB is obtained by invoking the smooth-pasting condition'8 
aE 
- 0. (31) 
aV V=VB 
Solving, we find 
C7* 
V X-, (32) r 
where 
(xE + 1* (33) 
B. Optimal Coupon 
If one assumes that the payout ratio is independent of the chosen coupon 
level, then by using equation (32), the optimal coupon level can be obtained 
in closed form. 
The objective of management is to maximize shareholder wealth: 
max {(1 - q)D[VO, C, VB(C)] + E[VO, C, VB(C)]}. (34) 
c 
That is, current equity holders receive fair value for the debt claim sold, minus 
their portion of the restructuring costs. 
By differentiating equation (34) with respect to C and setting the equation 
to zero, we find that the optimal coupon level, chosen when firm value is 
VO, is 
16. If one wishes to model restructuring costs as tax deductible, then qD should be interpreted 
as equity's portion of the restructuring costs. Any portion of the restructuring costs "paid" by 
government (via decreased tax cash flows) has no effect on optimal capital structure choice. This 
is clear, since equity is maximizing its portion of debt plus equity, which is identical to minimizing 
the claims to (G + BC + RC). Thus, any transfers of wealth between government, bankruptcy 
costs, and restructuring costs will have no effect on capital structure decisions. 
17. See Leland (1994). This assumes that equity cannot precommit to a particular VB. 
18. See Dixit (1991); Dumas (1991). 
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vo() [(li)QAB)]-, (35) 
where 
B = X(1 - reff)[1 - (1 - q)(I - a)], 
A = (1 - q)( - )- (1 - reff) 
For there to be a tax advantage to debt, A must be positive. This can be 
interpreted as follows: if restructuring costs q were zero, the requirement hat 
A be positive is equivalent to the requirement that (7eff > -i). This result is 
reminiscent of the work of Miller (1977). For q > 0, the effective tax rate 
must be sufficiently high to cover both the taxes paid by the debt holders and 
the restructuring costs in order for there to be a tax benefit to debt. 
C. Tax Advantage to Debt 
Plugging equations (32) and (35) into equation (34), we find that the value 
of the equity claim just before the debt issuance is 
E(VO-) = {(1 - q)D[VO, C, VB(C*)] + E[VO, C , VB(C*)]} (36) 
= VO[(l Teff) + AQ], (37) 
where 
Q- S(Ai)(A)]< ~~~~~(38) 
Note that we can rewrite equation (36) as 
E(VO-) + RC = {D[VO, C *, VB(C*)] + E[VO, C*, VB(C*)]}, (39) 
where the restructuring c'osts are RC = qD[VO, C*, VB(C*)]. In this form, we 
see that equation (36) is the "no-arbitrage" condition of Fischer et al. (1989). 
In their language, the difference in value between the levered firm (the right- 
hand side of eq. [39]) and the unlevered firm, E(Vo_), is the cost to leverage 
the firm, RC. It is at this point that Fischer et al. (1989) begin their analysis, 
but in this framework it is clear that all tax advantages to debt have already 
been incorporated into E(VO). Indeed, from equations (5) and (37), we find 
the percentage increase in the value of equity to be 
% increase = 100 x AQ (40) (1- Teff) 
This statistic captures the tax advantage to debt in our (static) model. 
D. Coupon-Dependent Payout 
Above, we assumed that the payout ratio is independent of the coupon level. 
In practice, however, larger coupon payments are typically associated with 
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larger payout ratios. As a typical example, consider a debtless firm with current 
EBIT = $100, and a "price-earnings ratio" of 20. Hence, total claims to 
EBIT = $2,000. If -r = .35 and Td = .2, then the current equity value is 
2,000(1 - .35)(1 - .20) = $1,040. With EBIT = $100, and -r = .35, $35 is 
paid out to taxes. Of the remaining $65, assume $35 is paid out as dividend. 
Note that this implies a reasonable equity dividend payout ratio of 
35/1,040 = 3.37%. Also note that this implies that the firm as a whole has 
a payout ratio of (35 + 35)/2,000 = .035. The implication is that even debt- 
less firms have a relatively small drift A = r - (6/V) in this framework. 
Now, consider a firm that pays a coupon C. In this case, earnings before 
taxes falls to (100 - C). The corporate tax payout to government is then 
6govt = (.35)(100 - C). Assuming the same dividend payment of 35, the total 
payout is 
6 = [C + (100 - C)(.35) + 35] = 70 + .65C. 
Hence, the initial payout ratio is 
6 C 
- = .035 + .65-. (41) 
As in previous models of optimal capital structure, we assume the payout 
ratio remains constant. That is, we assume 
6 C 
- = .035 + .65 (42) 
for all values of V. This is a reasonable assumption in our model because the 
payout to government in the form of taxes moves in the same direction as 
the value of the claim to EBIT. Thus, in contrast to previous frameworks, 
only minor changes need be made to the equity dividend ratio for this as- 
sumption to hold. 
Using data from Compustat, we test equation (41) to see whether firms 
with large interest payments tend to lower their dividend payments in an 
attempt to reduce the total payout ratio. That is, we test whether the coefficient 
of C/V is less than (1 - i) ; .65. In fact, we find 
6 C 
- = .017 + .764-, (43) V V9 
with t-statistics above 15 for both coefficients. While admittedly such a cross- 
sectional analysis may not be an appropriate measure of how a capital structure 
decision of an individual firm affects the payout ratio, it does seem to support 
the notion that a firm's total payout increases with interest payments. 
E. Loss of Tax Shelter 
Recall from equation (24) that the equity claim can be written as the risk- 
neutral expectation 
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E,01V(VO) = (1 - Teff)EQ If dse rs(6 C)]. (44) 
However, this simple formula obtains only because we previously assumed 
that the firm receives full loss offset. In practice, when a firm is not profitable, 
it loses part of its tax shelter, receiving only tax carry-forward benefits to 
account for loss of tax shields. We now assume that, for current firm value 
Vs above some specified value V., the instantaneous claim of equity remains 
Peq(Vs > V-) = (1 - Teff)(6s - C)01(i>s) (45) 
But now, when firm value drops below V., some of the tax benefits are lost, 
exposing equity to a larger proportion of the debt payment.'9 
Peq(Vs < V-) = [(1 - Teff)6s - (1 - 8Teff)C]l(Ths). (46) 
Here, s is constrained to the region 0 < s < 1. If s = 1, we have the full- 
loss offset model above. However, if we set s = 0, then equity loses all tax 
shields when the claim to EBIT falls below V.. Due to tax-loss carry-forwards 
and carry-backs, the best estimate lies somewhere in the middle. The solution 
to this model is similar to that in Leland and Toft (1996) and is derived in 
appendix A. 
F. Comparative Statics 
Our base case parameters are -r = .35, -i = .35, -r = .2, r = .045, aU 
.25, a = .05, s = .5, q = .01, a firm P: E ratio of 17, and 6/V = .035 + 
.65(C/VO). Note that r = .045 is an after-tax risk-free rate, since we are dealing 
with after-tax dollars. Hence, ,u = [(r - (6/VO)] = .01 - .65(C/VO). Since 
V = 17 * EBIT, the firm will begin to lose tax benefits when firm value falls 
to V. = 17C. It is interesting to note that, whereas previous frameworks needed 
to assume unreasonable bankruptcy costs to obtain reasonable estimates for 
optimal leverage ratios and credit spreads, in this framework we can set el to 
a value that is more consistent with bankruptcy and recovery rates that are 
observed in practice.20 The results are collected in table 1. 
Most comparative statics results are similar to Leland (1994). However, in 
contrast to Leland (1994), equity is a decreasing function of r 2' This is 
because, in the present framework, an increase in Teff increases the government 
19. This model can be generalized by assuming that the amount of lost tax shield is an 
increasing function of (V* - V). Such a model is probably more realistic, since the lower V drops 
below V*, the lower the probability that the firm will return to profitability in order to use the 
tax carry-forward benefits. 
20. Warner (1977) finds direct bankruptcy costs to be about 1%. However, we also account 
for indirect costs in choosing 5% for a in the base case. 
21. We emphasize that, even though the tax benefit is an increasing function of r,, equity is 
a decreasing function of r,. For example, when r, = .35 equity rises 6.3% from 52.0 to 55.3 
when management decides to issue debt. However, when r, = .33, equity rises 5.1% from 53.6 
to 56.3 when management decides to issue debt. Although tax benefits close the gap, our model 
predicts equity is still better off with lower taxes. 
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TABLE 1 Comparative Statics for Select Parameter Values (Static Model) 
Optimal Bankruptcy Optimal Credit Recovery Tax Advantage 
Coupon* Levelt Leveraget Spread? Ratell to Debt# 
Base 2.52 29.4 49.8 221 52.9 6.3 
a =.03 2.62 30.6 51.3 228 54.2 6.5 
a =.10 2.29 26.9 46.3 207 49.6 5.7 
r= .33 2.42 28.1 47.8 205 53.2 5.1 
r= .37 2.60 30.6 51.6 237 52.5 7.5 
a = .23 2.55 31.3 51.5 199 54.1 6.8 
a = .27 2.48 27.7 48.1 245 51.6 5.9 
r = .040 2.46 30.2 52.2 235 51.6 6.6 
r = .050 2.56 28.65 47.6 207 54.0 6.0 
? = .3 2.36 29.1 47.7 206 54.8 5.9 
? = .7 2.80 30.4 53.5 250 50.6 6.9 
* (C/VO) x 100. 
t (VWVA) x loo. 
t [DI(Do+E0)] x 100. 
? {(C/Do)-[r/(1-I)]1 X 10 4. 
11 (DefDo) x 100. 
# {[E(Vo-) -(1 - Tff)VQ]l[(l - reff)VQ]1 x 100. 
claim at the expense of equity, while in Leland (1994), an increase in r 
increases the tax benefit (i.e., inflow of cash). Of course, in Leland (1994), 
the comparative static is performed while holding unlevered firm value con- 
stant, which is unlikely to be true when taxes are increased. Indeed, Lang and 
Shackelford (1998) find a strong price reaction to the signing of the 1995 
budget accord. The advantage of treating all claimants on a systematic basis 
is that it allows a precise prediction for the effect that changes in tax code 
have on equity. 
As with most static models, the predicted optimal initial leverage ratio is 
well above what is observed in practice. As we shall see in the next section, 
accounting for the fact that equity has the option to increase future debt levels 
reduces this ratio considerably. 
G. Equity Pricing with Future (Static) Capital Structure Changes 
In practice, management may decide to operate for many years without taking 
on any debt. In such a case, equity holders must take management's decision 
as given, and price equity shares appropriately. Here, we demonstrate to what 
extent the claim of Kane et al. (1984), that the vafue of unlevered assets 
reflects the potential to lever them optimally in the future, is valid. We de- 
termine the value of equity at time t for an unlevered firm whose management 
has promised to leverage optimally at a future date T. Of course, a more 
realistic scenario is that equity holders account for the possibility that at some 
point in the future a firm may either decide to take on some debt or be bought 
out at the levered price, in which case T is a random variable. We deal with 
this more realistic case below. 
Consider a debtless firm, at time t, which commits to leveraging optimally 
at some future time T. Hence, during the time interval s, (t < s < T), equity 
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holders have a claim to after-tax cash flows of (1 - Teff)6s, and at time T, they 
will have a claim worth E(VT_), as defined in equation (36). The present value 
of these claims is 
E(t) = (1 - 7eff)V + e-(r-A)(T-t)VtAQ. (47) 
Consider E(t) as a function of T. For T > t, the tax advantages to debt will 
not be realized for a long time, and thus the value of equity will be only 
slightly larger than that of a firm that refuses to ever take on debt (eq. [5]). 
As T approaches t almost all tax benefits to debt are reflected in the equity 
price (eq. [36]). Note that only when T = t+ does the Fischer et al. (1989) 
"no-arbitrage" condition hold. That is, only moments before the restructuring 
is to occur does the unlevered equity value equal the levered value, minus 
restructuring costs. 
Above, we took T to be a predetermined number. In practice, the time at 
which management decides to take on debt, or the time at which an outside 
firm attempts to purchase the unlevered firm, is random.22 If we assume that 
T, at time t, has an exponential distribution, independent of EBIT value 
dynamics, 
7(t = T)I7t = (1/T)e-(1/T)(T-t)(T>t), (48) 
where T is the expected time of restructuring, then the current equity has a 
simple closed-form solution: 
E(t) = (1 - eff)Vt + Vt - ))YAQ. (49) 
Again, for large T, equity value is only slightly larger than_the value of equity 
for a firm that refuses to ever take on debt, whereas for T - 0+ , almost all 
tax benefits are already embedded in equity value. 
III. Optimal Upward Dynamic Capital Structure Strategy 
In this section, we determine the optimal capital structure strategy for a firm 
that has the option to increase its debt level in the future. As in Fischer et al. 
(1989), we find that there will be a range of debt ratios for which management 
will maintain its current debt level. Similar to Section II, there will be a 
threshold VB, where the firm will optimally choose bankruptcy. But now, there 
will also be a threshold Vu, where management will call the outstanding debt 
issue, and sell a new, larger issue. 
The tractability of our model stems from a scaling feature inherent in 
modeling the EBIT claim dynamics as log-normal (or proportional). Indeed, 
22. We assume here that the outside firm would have to pay leveraged-firm value in order 
for the takeover to be successful. This assumption seems to hold in practice. 
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UV2 
V0 
VBO 
FIG. 1.-A typical sample path of firm value with log-normal dynamics. Initially, 
firm value is VO. Period 0 ends either by firm value reaching VB, at which point the 
firm declares bankruptcy, or by firm value reaching Vu, at which point the debt is 
recalled and the firm again chooses an optimal capital structure. Note that the initial 
firm value at the beginning of period 1 is VO = VOyVO. Due to log-normal firm 
dynamics, it will be optimal to choose Vu = ynVO, Vn = ynV?. 
some implications of this scaling feature are already apparent in the static 
model of the previous section. For example, note that, from equation (32), 
the optimal bankruptcy level VB is proportional to the optimal coupon and 
that, from equation (35), the optimal coupon is proportional to VO. This implies 
that if two firms A and B are identical (i.e., same volatility a and payout ratio 
6/V) except that their initial values differ by a factor VO = yVOA, then the 
optimal coupon CB = yCA, the optimal bankruptcy level VBB = 'yVBA, and 
every claim will be larger by the same factor y..Note that this same argument 
also holds for a single firm that first issues debt at firm value VO, and later 
finds its value has increased to Vu = yVO, at which time it calls all outstanding 
debt and then, as an unlevered firm, takes on an optimal level of debt. For 
our dynamic model, the scaling feature implies that since the period 1 initial 
value, Voj = Vuo yVO?, will be a factor y larger than its time 0 initial value, 
it will be optimal to choose C' = yC0, VB' = yVBO, VU = yVuo, and all period 
1 claims will scale upward by the same factor y. This behavior is captured 
in figure 1. 
We assume that the debt is callable at par to simplify the analysis.23 However, 
23. Two changes must be made if the debt were not modeled as callable. First, the restructuring 
costs need to have both a fixed component, proportional to current firm value, and a variable 
component, proportional to the amount of new debt issued. The fixed component prevents in- 
finitesimal increases in debt from being an optimal strategy. The second change is more difficult. 
In our analysis below, every period looks the same, because after the debt is called, the firm is 
again all equity and simply larger by a factor 'y from the previous period. However, if debt is 
not callable, then the first period, where debt goes from zero to some finite amount, is different 
from all other periods, where the debt jumps by a factor y. Treating the first period differently 
from all the others complicates the analysis without providing any additional insights. 
EBIT-Based Model 501 
we claim that, taking management's strategy as given, the value of the debt 
issue would be the same even if it were not callable, as long as we assume 
that all debt issues receive the same recovery rate in the event of bankruptcy.24 
To prove this claim, we must show that when firm value reaches V, that the 
value of the previously issued debt is identical to its original value, as if it 
were called at par. Due to the scaling feature inherent in our model, the 
bankruptcy threshold will rise by the same factor y = V,/Vo that firm value 
has risen. The implication is that the probability of bankruptcy at the beginning 
of each period will be the same: simply, all claims will have scaled up by 
the same factor y. Since the old debt still has the same promised coupon 
flows, and since it faces the same risk of (and recovery rate in the event of) 
bankruptcy as it had at issuance, it follows that its price must equal its initial 
par value. Note that, in contrast to the static models, this framework implies 
that debt is not a monotonically increasing function of firm value. 
We develop the model as follows. First, we determine the value of the 
period 0 claims. We then point out that if it is optimal for each period's coupon 
payments, default threshold, and bankruptcy threshold to increase by the same 
factor y that the "initial" EBIT value increases by each period, then all claims 
will also scale up by this same factor. Then, taking this strategy to be optimal, 
we determine the present value of all claims. In appendix B we use a backward 
induction scheme to demonstrate that such a strategy is in fact optimal. 
A. Present Value of Period 0 Claims 
In order to determine the value of the total claims, it is convenient to first 
evaluate the claims to cash flows during period 0, that is, the value of cash 
flows before firm value reaches V,.25 We then use the scaling argument to 
determine future period claim values in terms of the period 0 claim values. 
It is convenient to define p,(V) as the present value of a claim that pays 
$1 contingent on firm value reaching V, (before reaching VB). Since such a 
claim receives no dividend, we know from equation (10) that p,(V) will be 
of the form 
pU(V) = A1V Y + A2V-X (50) 
and will satisfy the boundary conditions 
PU(VB) = O, PU(VU) = 1. (51) 
Plugging in, we find 
24. We can actually account for a type of seniority, where older issues receive a higher 
recovery rate in the event of bankruptcy and still obtain closed-form solutions. Basically, the 
recovery rate for a debt issue sold n periods in the past receives in bankruptcy a recovery rate 
(1 - pn), where p(< 1) is determined so that the total payout to all debt issues sums to the asset 
value remaining after bankruptcy costs are paid. Note that debt issued long ago (n -+ oo) is nearly 
riskless in this model. 
25. It is more appropriate to define the variables as V?,V?, since the boundaries will scale 
upward in the next period. However, the superscript notation is too clumsy when these factors 
are written to some power. Therefore, we simplify the notation at the expense of conciseness. 
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p'(V)= - E Vy + - V-, (52) 
where we have defined 
- VB YVU - VU7YVB. (53) 
Similarly, it is convenient to define PB(V) as the present value of a claim 
that pays $1 contingent on firm value reaching VB (before reaching Vu). We 
find 
PB(V) = v v-V-x (54) 
All period 0 claims can be written compactly in terms of p,(V) and 
PB(V). For example, consider the claim, VsO to the payout 6 for as long as 
current firm value remains between V, and VB. From equation (15), VOolv(V) 
will be of the form 
VMO?(V) = V + A1V-y + A2VX (55) 
and will satisfy the boundary conditions 
YOOV(VB) = 0, VO1V(VU) = 0. (56) 
Plugging in, we find 
sOOIJV) = V - pU(V)U - PB(V)VB (57) 
Similarly, the claim to interest rate payments during period 0 is 
Co 
Vin,(V) = -[1 PU(V) PB(V)], (58) r 
and the claim to all EBIT at the moment firm value reaches VB and defaults 
iS 
Vdef(V) = PB(V)VB (59) 
As before, the restructuring costs are a proportion q of the value of the debt 
issue. 
The claim to all EBIT at the moment firm value reaches Vu and restructures 
is 
V,eos(V) = Pu(V)Vu (60) 
Below, we use the scaling inherent in the model to determine what portion 
of this claim belongs to the different claimants. Note that the sum 
Vsolv(V) + Vdef(V) + V1<s(V) = V1 
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so again EBIT value is invariant to capital structure choice-only distribution 
of assets is affected by capital structure decisions. 
Assuming full-loss offset, the period 0 claim values, after the restructuring 
occurs, are 
do(V) = (1 - 
rj)VjO,(V) + (1 - a)(1 - Teff)Vf(V) (61) 
e0(V) = (1 
-Teff)[Vsolv(V) - Vint(V)], (62) 
g0(V) = Teff[VYolv(V) - Vit(V)] + riVi4(V) + (1 - 
a)reffVr, 
(V), (63) 
bc 0(V) = ozVdef(V). (64) 
The case where tax benefits are lost is considered in appendix A. 
Note that the claims described in equations (61)-(64) sum to V.1 (V) + 
Vdof(V), which is equivalent to V - p,(V)V,. The intuition is that we have yet 
to "dole out" the value of claims to cash flows in future periods Ves = 
PU(VVU. 
B. Present Value of Future Period Claims 
It is convenient to "reset time" back to zero at each instant the firm restructures. 
Hence, the period 1 initial firm value equals the upper boundary value of 
period 0. Varying slightly from the above notation, 
VO' = Vu?Y-VO?. 
Note that if both the lower and upper boundary also scale by the same factor: 
VU = 'YVU VB =Y VB 
then it follows from their definitions that 
p (V ) = p (V0)'PU(VO) =PU(VO). 
If the optimal coupon C* also scales upward by a factor y each period, then 
necessarily so will each claim on EBIT, as is clear from equations (57)-(59). 
Due to this scaling feature, the firm will look identical at every restructuring 
date, except that all factors will be scaled up by a factor ay = Vu/Vo. Hence, 
the ratios of the different claims must remain invariant for all periods. Thus, 
all remaining firm value not "doled out" in the period 0 claims must be divided 
among the claimants in the same proportions as in the period 0 claims. Now, 
define e(V) as the equity claim to intertemporal EBIT flows for all periods, 
with similar definitions for d(V), g(V), bc(V). We emphasize that e(V) is not 
the total equity claim, since there are also cash transfers between the claimants 
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at each restructuring date.26 We obtain the total equity claim value, E(V), 
below. 
The scaling feature inherent in our model implies 
e(VO) _ d(Vo) _ g(Vo) Vo 1 
eo(VO) do(VO) go(VO) Vo - VO?(V0)p,(V0) 1 - 'Pu(V0) (65) 
Thus, for example, the equity claim to intertemporal cash flows can be written 
1-ye 0(VO) (66) 
I- 1-YPU(V0) 
The relation between the period 0 claim and the claim to cash flows for all 
periods has a simple intuitive explanation. One can rewrite equation (66) as 
e 0(VO) 
1= e(V0){ 1 + 'ypU(V0) + [YPU(V0)]2 + **} 1 - ypU(V0) ] 
= e0(Vo){I [YPu(Vo)]'J 
In particular, at time 0, the present value of the claim to the period j cash 
flow is a factor [-ypu(Vo)]j times the present value of the period 0 cash flow. 
The factor y expresses the increase in size of the future cash flows, and the 
factor pu(VO) captures the discount for time and risk. 
C. Cash Flow Transfers at Restructuring Dates 
In order to determine the portion of the future "debt claims" that currently 
belong to equity and restructuring costs, we first determine the value of the 
initial debt issue. We assume that the debt issue is called at par. Hence, the 
initial value of the debt claim equals the sum of the claim to period 0 cash 
flows, do(V), plus the present value of the call value: 
D0(VO) = do(VO) + pu(Vo)D0(Vo), (67) 
which can be written as 
D01(V) 1-p(VO) (68) 
In order to receive this claim, debt holders must pay fair value, namely, 
D0(VO), at the time of issuance. This inflow of cash is divided between equity 
and restructuring costs in the proportion (1 - q) and q, respectively. Using 
the scaling argument, the total restructuring claim is 
26. This is because the claims to future debt issues are currently owned by equity and 
restructuring costs. Future debt holders will have to pay fair price in the future for these claims. 
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RC(VO-) = qD0(V0)[I + 'yPu(Vo) + ] (69) 
1 
= qD0 (V)1 - ypu(Vo) (70) 
The total equity claim, just before the initial debt issuance, is the sum of 
the intertemporal claims of debt and equity, less the restructuring costs claim: 
E(V = eo(VO) + do(VO) - qD0(VO) (71) 
1 - ypU(V0) 
Anytime after the initial debt issuance, the total equity claim for arbitrary V 
during period 0 is 
E(V) = 'ypu(V)E(VO-) + e0(V) -pu(V)D0(VO). (72) 
This reduces to 
E(Vo+) = E(Vo- - (1 - q)D?(V0) (73) 
immediately after the debt issuance, as necessary to preclude arbitrage. It also 
reduces to 
E(Vu_) = -yE(Vo-) - D(Vo), (74) 
just before the next issuance, demonstrating that the scaling feature obtains 
after equity pays the call price of the period 0 bond. 
D. Optimal Dynamic Capital Structure 
Management's objective is to choose C, -y Vu/Vo, and ,6-VB/VO in order 
to maximize the wealth of the equity holder, subject to limited liability.27 As 
before, VB is determined by the smooth-pasting condition. The results are 
tabulated in table 2. Note that the optimal initial leverage ratio is substantially 
lower than that obtained in Section II and reasonably consistent with leverage 
ratios observed in practice. The intuition of this result is straightforward: since 
the firm has the option to increase its leverage in the future, it will wait until 
firm value rises to the point where it becomes optimal to exercise this option. 
Also note that the tax advantage to debt has increased significantly. This is 
intuitive, because the static model implies that the long-run expected leverage 
ratio drops to zero, as (expected) firm value increases exponentially. Hence, 
the long-run expected tax benefits become negligible in the static model. 
Finally, note that VB has dropped significantly in the dynamic case. This can 
be understood in that a firm that has the option to adjust its capital structure 
27. Since the debt is callable, we have assumed that management can precommit to a particular 
V, in the bond indenture. It is straightforward to also consider the case where Vu cannot be 
precommitted to. 
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TABLE 2 Comparative Statics for Select Parameter Values (Upward- 
Restructuring Model) 
Optimal Bankruptcy Restructure Optimal Credit Recovery Tax Advan- 
Coupon* Levelt Levelf Leverage? Spreadll Rate# tage to Debt** 
Base 1.85 21.78 169.74 37.14 193.55 51.43 8.31 
c = .03 1.92 22.55 169.08 38.24 198.43 52.67 8.59 
ca = .10 1.70 20.05 171.30 34.63 182.72 48.39 7.69 
=.33 1.80 21.07 176.30 36.07 180.38 51.97 6.76 
=.37 1.89 22.38 164.48 38.04 205.87 50.81 9.97 
a = .23 1.93 23.80 165.35 39.40 173.86 52.82 8.65 
a = .27 1.78 19.95 174.08 35.04 214.13 50.07 8.00 
r = .040 1.75 21.59 170.61 37.84 202.11 49.75 8.98 
r = .050 1.94 21.78 168.91 36.28 183.69 52.92 7.74 
s = .3 1.74 21.55 170.82 35.55 180.98 53.36 7.90 
s= .7 2.06 22.50 168.19 39.93 216.01 49.10 9.01 
* (C/ VO) x 100. 
t(VBIVO) x loo' 
t (VJVO) x 100. 
? [DJ(Do+E0)] x 100. 
1 {(C/Do) - [r/(1 -T,)]} X 10 . 
# (D.jD0) x 100. 
** {[E(V0-)-(1 Teff)VO]/[(1 Teff)VO]} X 100. 
is more valuable and hence will have incentive to avert bankruptcy at EBIT- 
value levels for which a firm that is constrained to its previously chosen debt 
level will choose to default. 
IV. Conclusion 
A model of dynamic capital structure is proposed. We find that when a firm 
has the option to increase debt levels, our model predicts optimal debt levels 
and credit spreads similar to those observed in practice. Further, the tax benefits 
to debt increase significantly over the static-case predictions. 
We argued above why accounting for upward restructures may in practice 
be more important than accounting for downward restructures. Still, since 
downward restructuring does occur sometimes in practice, our model will bias 
the optimal leverage ratio downward. We note that our framework can in- 
corporate downward restructuring also, and the model is available on request 
from the authors. However, our framework neglects issues such as asset sub- 
stitution, asymmetric information, equity's ability to force concessions, Chap- 
ter 11 protection,28 and many other important features that would affect optimal 
strategy at a lower boundary. Thus we are skeptical about the results that 
obtain when extending our model to account for downward restructures. 
Appendix A 
Following the approach of Leland and Toft (1996), we derive the value of equity 
assuming that it loses some of its tax shield when EBIT value V drops below some 
28. See, e.g., Francois and Morellec (2001). 
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specified level V.. As mentioned in the text, we assume that the payout ratio is a 
constant: 
b C 
-V = .035 + .65-. (Al) 
Also, we assume that V. = 17C. Hence, for a given coupon rate, both b/V and V. are 
constants. We derive the equity value for all cases considered in the text. 
Static Case 
It was demonstrated in equation (24) that the equity claim can be written as 
EOlv (V,) = (1 -Teff) E, [fds e 'r's)(6 - C)], (A2) 
where T is the (random) time of bankruptcy. That is, equity could be priced as if it 
had an instantaneous payout 
PEq (S) = (1 Teff )(bs C)l(s<T* (A3) 
To account for the loss of tax shields, we now assume that the "effective payout" 
takes the form 
PEq(S) = |K(6, -C)l(s<T) if V> V. (A4) 
(Kb, - HC)l(,<b if V< V., (4 
where 
K _ (1 -Teff), H -(1 - Teff), 
where s is a parameter in the range O < s < 1. Ife = 1, then H = K, and the model 
reduces to the full-offset case. When s = 0, then equity loses all tax benefits to debt 
when V< V.. Due to loss carry-forwards, the best estimate of s is some intermediate 
value. 
Using arguments in Section II, we know equity will be of the form 
AjV-Y+A2V-x+K(V ) if(V>V.) 
E(V) = + + (AS) 
BjV-Y +B2V-X +|KV - H- if (V< V*). 
Due to the boundary condition E(V X ??) X K[V - (Cir)], we know A1 = 0. The other 
three boundary conditions are 
E(V = VB) = 0, (A6) 
E(V = V1T) = E(V = V.,), (A7) 
EV(V = V*T) = EV(V = V.,). (A8) 
Solving, we find 
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B = x(H - K)CVy (A9) 
r(x - Y) 
Vx 
B2 = (HClr-KVB)VBX-B VBY, (AIO) 
A2 = B2 + yBlV*x/(xV*Y). (A1) 
Note that these equations hold for any given VB. Equity chooses VB using the smooth- 
pasting condition 
EV(V = VB) = 0. (A12) 
This implies 
0 = K(YB1VBYB+XB2V )/Vl (A13) 
Upward Restructuring 
From previous arguments, we know that the period 0 equity claim has the form 
AjV-Y+A2V-x+K(VXV ) if(V>V.) 
e?(V) = r+ ( (A14) 
BjV-Y +B2V-x +(V - H if (V< V.). 
By definition, the period 0 claim must vanish at V = V,. Hence, the four boundary 
conditions are 
e?(V = Vu) = 0, (A15) 
eo(V = VB) = 0, (A16) 
eo(V = V*T) = eo(V = V.,), (A17) 
eo(V = V*T) = eo(V = 
V.,). 
(A18) 
Define the constants 
= VB Y, C2 = VB7 
C3 = VU C4 = VU 7 
C5= V*, C6 = VX, 
l= c4 - C2C3. 
Then we find 
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B1 = (HClr - KVB)c4,E + K(VU - Clr)c2,E 
+ (K- H)Clrc2(xc3/c5 - yc4/c6)/[(x - y)E], (A19) 
B2 = (HClr - KVB)/C2 - B,cl/c2, (A20) 
Al = B1 - x(K - H)Clrl[(y - x)c5], (A21) 
A2 = B2- y(K - H)Clrl[(x - y)c6]. (A22) 
Appendix B 
Here we demonstrate that it will be optimal to increase C*, VB*, and Vu* each period 
by the same factor y V=/VO that the "initial firm value" scales by. But before we 
offer a mathematical backward-induction argument, we first give the following intuitive 
argument. 
Suppose the optimal strategy for the first period is to issue debt with total coupon 
C and call back the bond at V,. Suppose the dollar is the monetary unit used initially. 
That is, the firm value at the beginning of the first period is V0 dollars, and the bond 
will be called when the firm value rises to Vu dollars. Now, for the next period, consider 
a change in numeraire from dollars to y-dollars, where we define y _-V/VO. In terms 
of the new numeraire, the firm value at the beginning of the second period is V0. 
Because of the log-normal process, the drift and diffusion are unaffected by the change 
in numeraire: 
dVu ydV0 dV0 Vu -Vo = V = Zdt + dzQ. 
Therefore the firm at the beginning of the next period in terms of the new numeraire 
is identical to the firm at the beginning of the current period in terms of dollars. Hence, 
if the optimal strategy at the beginning of the current period is to issue debt with total 
coupon C0 dollars per year and to call back the debt when the firm value rises to 
Vu dollars, then the optimal strategy at the beginning of the next period must be to 
issue a bond with coupon Co measured in new numeraire, which equals yC0 dollars, 
and call it back when firm value reaches Vu measured in the new numeraire, which 
equals yVu dollars. 
We now demonstrate this scaling feature more rigorously by use of a backward- 
induction argument. Note that for models with a finite number of periods N, the 
backward-induction approach first determines the optimal strategy for the next-to-last 
period N - 1, and then works backward period by period to determine the entire optimal 
strategy. However, for infinite-period "games," this is clearly not possible. Still, the 
optimality is guaranteed by the following argument. 
The present value of equity is equal to the sum of the present value of each period's 
cash flows to equity: 
510 Journal of Business 
E = Ej j=O 
N-1 i 
= e *+ ejN. (B1) 
j=O j=N 
Note that the total equity value is strictly bounded above by the claim to EBIT, V. 
Hence, for arbitrarily large N, it must be that 
lim( ej - 0. (B2) 
N-0 j=N 
This result is perfectly intuitive: most of the equity value is due to cash flows the 
holders will receive over the next century, say. The implication is that, as we increase 
N -? 0, the strategy chosen for all periods greater than N has an increasingly negligible 
effect on the present value of equity. Hence, if we impose a given strategy on the 
firm for all periods greater than some arbitrarily large number N, such a constraint 
becomes increasingly unimportant. Yet, if we constrain the firm to take the strategy 
we have proposed in the text for all periods greater than N, we can show that the firm 
will optimally choose never to stray from this proposed strategy in the previous periods. 
This is done by showing it is optimal in period N - 1 to follow the proposed strategy. 
By repeating the same inductive argument, we find it is optimal to follow this strategy 
for all periods before N. 
We note that if our scaling assumption is valid, then C * and y * are obtained from 
first-order conditions of equation (71) 
E(Vo 0 aE(Vo =0. (B3) 
ac a 
The smooth-pasting condition applied to equation (72) determines the optimal bank- 
ruptcy threshold: 
dE(V) = (B4) 
aV 
- 
V = VB 
Here we demonstrate that the proposed solution is in fact optimal. We constrain the 
firm to take the strategy implied from equations (B3)-(B4) for all periods greater than 
N, but allow it to choose any strategy for period (N - 1). With this strategy, the firm's 
equity before the start of period (N - 1) takes the form 
) = ypu(Vc- )E(y*,y*,C*) + e(VO1) + D(Vo -)[1 - q 
-p,(VoN)]- (BS) 
Let us interpret this equation. Effectively, the equity holder has a claim to future equity 
flows, whose future initial value, yE*, is discounted by p,(VON-1). In addition, she 
receives dividend flow during the period currently valued at e(VON-1), and payment 
from new debt holders of magnitude D(VoN-1)(1 - q) to begin the period. However, 
she also has an obligation to pay the call price of the debt, with present value 
D(Vo->)pu(Vo -1) to "finish" the current period. Using similar arguments, the equity 
claim after the period begins can be shown to be 
E(VN1) = -pu(V )E(y, * C*) + e(VN-l ) -p U(VN-1 )D(V -l). (B6) 
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Taking the first order conditions and smooth-pasting condition for this model produces 
the same optimal choice variables as in equations (B3)-(B4). 
We note that the determination of an optimal control strategy for an infinite-period 
game has been investigated previously in many other settings. For example, Taksar, 
Klass, and Assaf (1988) investigate the optimal trading strategy for an individual in 
an economy with a risky and risk-free asset who is free to adjust her portfolio at will 
but faces a transactions cost. More generally, Harrison (1985, p. 86) investigates the 
properties of models with a "regenerative structure." 
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